學術瘴氣

The wailing about how the Iraqis are not up to it is not an unfamiliar one from conquerors. Right now, some very interesting work is being done by a former Russian soldier in Afghanistan, on the coverage of the Afghan invasion and occupation in the Soviet press. Very familiar, including distress that the Afghans are just not up to it and have to be held accountable. Colonial administrators, slave masters, and others like them constantly express great irritation at the shiftlessness and irresponsibility of their wards, not properly following commands -- issued for their benefit, of course. How can we help the Iraqi people? By putting them in charge, and doing what they instruct us to do -- which, judging by US-run polls, would mean getting out pretty quickly. And though the question cannot be included in US-run polls for doctrinal reasons, I don't think it is hard to guess how Iraqis would respond if asked whether we ought to pay enormous reparations for crimes of the past half century, including strong US support for Saddam through his worst atrocities, horrendous sanctions that destroyed much of the society, and finally an invasion and occupation which brought about a catastrophe that they compare to the Mongol invasions.

Public opinion was also sampled in 1969. About 70% held that the war was not "a mistake" but was "fundamentally wrong and immoral," a position virtually inexpressible in the mainstream. That persists. Public opinion remained about the same until the most recent polls by the same major polling institution, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 30 years later. And the position remained (and remains) virtually inexpressible in the mainstream. Consistent results over 30 years have considerable credibility. What do the results mean? The director of the study, a respected political scientist, interpreted the results as meaning that respondents felt that too many Americans were being killed. Possible, but not an obvious interpretation. On that assumption, for example, why did the vast majority hold that the war was not a mistake? Another possibility is that people meant just what they said, and that it cannot be comprehended within the elite intellectual culture. It would have been easy enough to find out through the 30 years of polling on these matters, but no attempt was made, to my knowledge. Polls are of great value, and tell us a lot. Particularly when attitudes are consistent and coherent over long periods, as they typically are; a valuable study on this is Benjamin Page and Marshall Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect (2006). But they always have to be used with caution, particularly when results appear internally contradictory or otherwise obscure.